The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of auditor type and earnings reporting lag on the cost of debt for the Tunisian setting. Our sample consists of 32 Tunisian companies for the period of 2003-2012. Audit quality is measured by auditor size (Big 4 versus non-Big 4) and timely disclosure is proxied by earnings reporting lag.
Introduction
Recent financial scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) have raised questions about the audit quality and timely disclosure worldwide since financial statement credibility relies strongly on them. DeAngelo (1981, p. 117 ) defined audit quality as "the probability that an auditor will both detect material misstatements in the client's financial statements and report these misstatements". The question of whether audit quality and timely disclosure affect the cost of debt represents an important issue in accounting and finance (Causholli & Knechel, 2012) . To respond to this question, several studies have been conducted to examine such a question in developed countries (e.g., Sengupta, 1998 in USA, Piot & Missonier-Piera, 2009 in France, Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004 in USA, Karjalainen, 2011 in Finland, Causholli & Knechel, 2012 in USA, Fung & Goodwin, 2013 in USA, Koren, Kosi, & Valentincic, 2014 in Slovenia) . However, this topic remains under-researched in emerging economies where financial institutions play a critical role in financing firms' activities (Guidara, Khlif, & Jarboui, 2014) and where audit quality substitutes for conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors (Fan & Wong, 2005) .
Therefore, it becomes important to examine such question in emerging market where financial institutions play a critical role in financing firms' activities (Khlif, Samaha, & Azzam, 2015) . In this study, we focus on the Tunisian setting which represents a French civil law country characterized by low legal enforcement (World Bank, 2006 ). This context is representative for MENA countries and shares several similarities with them. In addition, there is a lack of empirical evidence on Tunisia compared to other countries such as Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. In an attempt to fill this gap, we try to focus on such setting to examine how audit quality and timely disclosure may affect the cost of debt financing in a weak legal system. According to recent report prepared by the African Development Bank (2012), the bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranges from 58% in 2006 to 62% in 2009, implying that the private sector in Tunisia relies strongly on financial institutions.
Given these unique characteristics of Tunisian setting and the crucial role played by banks in Tunisia, it becomes important to understand how creditors (banks) react to audit quality and reporting lag. Therefore, the aim of our study is to investigate the relationship between audit quality and timely disclosure on the cost of debt in Tunisia from 2003 to 2012. Audit quality and timely disclosure are respectively estimated using auditor type (Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors) and earnings reporting lag. We try to test also whether industry, listing status, and legal and institutional changes moderate the examined relationships.
We find that auditor type is negatively associated with the cost of debt. By contrast, the association between earnings reporting lag and the cost of debt is positive and significant. When testing for the moderating effects of industry and listing status, we provide evidence that these associations are more pronounced for industrial companies and listed firms. Furthermore, the legal and institutional changes across the period of investigation slightly moderate the examined associations.
Our paper contributes to the extant accounting literature dealing with the effect of audit quality and timely disclosure on the cost of finance by focusing on Tunisian setting. Our paper highlights the importance of audit quality and the timely communication of financial statements in reducing the information asymmetry and the agency costs between companies and creditors. Therefore, managers will have more incentives to increase corporate transparency to get loans at a lower cost.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about the major legal ad institutional changes from 2003 to 2012. Section 3 reviews the prior literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the research design. Section 5 reports the empirical findings. The final section concludes and offers ideas for future research.
Major Legal, Institutional, and Political Changes From 2003 to 2012
Since legal and political changes in one country may affect audit quality and financial institutions' policies, we try to present the major reforms and changes in Tunisia during the period of investigation (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) .
Tunisia is a French civil law country located in North Africa characterized by low legal enforcement (World Bank, 2006 (Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007) . These new reforms aim at increasing auditor independence and financial statement credibility among shareholders and creditors. According to Khanchel El Mehdi (2007) , these legal reforms represent a major progress towards enhancing corporate transparency. With respect to political changes, Tunisia has witnessed, by the end of 2010, a popular upraising and a political turmoil leading to some troubles in its economic situation during 2011 and 2012.
Literature Review Audit Quality and the Cost of Debt
In a bank-based financial system like Tunisia, financial institutions need to rely on alternative information sources, when assessing the borrowing firms' credit risk and monitoring debt contracts. Quality auditors may play an important role in mitigating information asymmetry between management and creditors through an increased credibility of financial information (Karjalainen, 2011) . This implies less information uncertainty and debt monitoring costs faced by banks and thus lower cost of debt (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
However, audit quality is unobservable and users of financial statements rely on other observable indirect indicators such as auditor size (Karjalainen, 2011 ). DeAngelo (1981 and Francis and Wilson (1988) suggested that larger auditors, commonly named Big 4, are expected to have more incentives to preserve their independence and provide high-quality audit services to maintain their reputation and enlarge their portfolio. DeAngelo (1981) added that audit quality is not independent of audit firm size and that higher-quality auditors are more likely to improve accounting controls and detect accounting irregularities due to greater knowledge and skills.
Furthermore, it could be argued that Big 4 audit firms provide superior audit since they enjoy quality robust training programs, standardized audit methodologies, and more industry specialization and knowledge to detect problems related to companies' financial reporting policy (Krishnan, 2005) . All these characteristics may improve the perceived audit quality by creditors, which in turn leads to lower information asymmetry between managers and creditors and reduced monitoring costs in debt contracts implying a lower cost of debt (Karjalainen, 2011; Causholli & Knechel, 2012) . For instance, the audit quality literature suggests that Big 4 auditors are associated with an increased probability of issuing modified audit reports (Francis & Krishnan, 1999) and more informative signals of financial distress for creditors (Lennox, 1999) .
Empirical evidence provided by Karjalainen (2011) in Finland suggests that the presence of Big 4 audit firms is negatively and significantly associated with the cost of debt. Thus, we test the following hypothesis:
H1: The association between audit quality and the cost of debt is negative and significant in the Tunisian setting.
Timely Disclosure and the Cost of Debt
Earnings announcement represents an important element of corporate transparency since it gives rise to the value relevance of information disclosed (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004) . Guidara et al. (2014) suggested that longer earnings announcement lag may increase the information asymmetry between firm and creditors, which translates into a high uncertainty level leading to a higher cost of debt. This is particularly true in emerging economies characterized by long delays in communicating financial statements such as Tunisia (World Bank, 2006) . Accordingly, timely disclosure in the Tunisian setting may increase the value relevance of information disclosed among debt-holders implying a lower cost of debt.
Empirical evidence in emerging economies is limited. For instance, Guidara et al. (2014) have examined the association between cost of debt and earnings reporting lag in an African setting, namely, South Africa and they documented that there is an insignificant association between both variables. In addition, Khlif et al. (2015) examined the effect of earnings announcement delay on cost of equity capital in Egypt and they documented a significant positive association between both variables. Thus, we test the following hypothesis:
H2: The association between timely disclosure and the cost of debt is positive and significant in the Tunisian setting. The effect of industry. Debreceny and Rahman (2005) suggested that different corporate reporting policies and accounting choices could prevail in different industries given the differences in technologies and the nature of activity. For instance, Dechow and Dichev (2001) pointed out that the industrial sector is characterized by a longer firm production cycle due to unfinished production activities and the completion and sale of their products. This implies that the audit procedures in the industrial sector will be different from other sectors (Khlif & Samaha, 2014) . In addition, industrial firms need more external finance to extend their activity which implies that they will have more incentives to communicate rapidly their financial statements to get loans at low costs. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis:
H3a: Industry has a moderating effect on the associations between audit quality, timely disclosure, and the cost of debt.
The effect of listing status. The listed firms are expected to be more transparent than unlisted firms because, on one hand, they must meet the regulatory requirements, and on the other hand, they must voluntarily disclose more information to reassure creditors and obtain better financing conditions. A listed company is subject to more stringent regulation compared to unlisted companies. This is particularly true in Tunisia where there are additional listing requirements, compared to non-listed companies, which are applied to all companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange. Such companies must comply with the Financial Act 94-117 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (Conseil du Marché Financier) regulations (Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007) . This implies that banks will require more transparency from listed companies given the stringent listing and legal requirements.
Several empirical studies show that listed companies tend to require higher audit quality and timely disclosure (Lee, Stokes, Taylor, & Walter, 2003) . A differentiated audit quality positively affects the confidence of investors in the information certified by the auditor and potentially determines the value of securities traded introduced (Titman & Trueman, 1986; Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 1991; Lee et al., 2003) . Thus, we test the following hypothesis:
H3b: Listing status has a moderating effect on the associations between audit quality, timely disclosure, and the cost of debt.
The effect of legal and political changes. As mentioned above (see Section 2), Tunisia has witnessed several legal changes during the period of investigation (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) The group did not prepare consolidated financial statements and the mother company reported net income of TND 3 million. During the receivership, three audit firms were appointed to determine the actual group net income, which turned out to be a loss of TND 67.5 million. The lack of consolidated financial statements precluded the investors, including 4,000 individual investors representing 7 percent of the share capital, and lenders from assessing the group's true financial condition and performance. Credit institutions are reported to have incurred loan losses amounting to TND 33 million in addition to a debt equity swap amounting to TND 37 million".
second period is from 2006 to 2009. This period is specifically characterized by the adoption of new governance rules to strengthen the security of financial transactions for either listed or unlisted companies. Finally, the Tunisian revolution period was characterized by some economic troubles which may affect financial institutions' behaviors with respect to the cost of debt. This period was characterized by the fragility of the economic and financial systems and more seriously the problem of trust between the different economic agents: managers, investors, and banks. Accordingly, we expect that these economic and political changes may affect the association between audit quality, timely disclosure, and the cost of debt. Thus, we test the following hypothesis:
H3c: Legal, institutional, and political changes have a moderating effect on the associations between audit quality, timely disclosure, and the cost of debt.
Research Methodology Sample and Data Collection
The data collected for the purpose of the study involve the examination of annual reports for the years from 2003 to 2012 of a sample of commercial and industrial companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange and other unlisted firms. Our empirical study focuses specifically on three periods: the first period before the adoption of the law of financial security from 2003 to 2005; the second period after the adoption of the law and before the Tunisian revolution from 2006 to 2009; and finally, the revolution period from 2010 to 2012. The companies included in our study are selected as follows. First, all financial firms are excluded since they are considered as a highly regulated sector. Second, we eliminated firms whose annual reports are not available or do not close their accounts on December 31. Therefore, our sample 2 includes 32 companies from the Tunisian setting (320 firm-year observations). Sectors represented in our sample include industrial, services, and commerce. Table 1 provides further information about the sample of companies included in our study. Table 1  Sample Description   2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  Total  S e c t o r  Industrial  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  180  Commercial  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  140  Total  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  320  Listing status  Listed companies  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  230  Unlisted companies  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  90  Total  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  320   Table 2 lists the variables included in our model. Data are collected from the official website of the Tunis Stock Exchange (http://www.bvmt.com.tn) and from the annual reports published on the website of the Financial Market Council (http://www.cmf.org.tn). Table 2 provides more detail about the data sources used to measure each variable in our model. 
Dependent Variable
Cost of debt is proxied by the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for firm i and year t divided by the short-term and long-term debts at the beginning of year t for firm i (Sengupta, 1998; Orens, Aerts, & Cormier, 2010; Guidara et al., 2014) :
Interest Expenses COD Short and Long Term Liabilities =
Audit Quality
Audit quality is proxied by auditor type. It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit firm is Big 4 and 0 if otherwise. Francis and Wilson (1988) also suggested that the international affiliation status of Big 4 audit firms allows them to provide more high-quality and faster audit services in order to distinguish themselves from local audit firms especially in emerging economies where there is a low accounting and auditing infrastructure (Elbannan, 2011) . Finally, Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011) stated that the structured audit approach is generally adopted by Big 4 audit firms.
Timely Disclosure
Timely disclosure is proxied by earnings reporting lag that represents the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements. In Tunisia, it is difficult to determine, in an accurate manner, this date since this information is not available for listed companies in the official website of the Tunis Stock Exchange and in firms' annual reports. Similarly, this information is not available also for unlisted companies in the official website of the Financial Market Council and in firms' annual reports. Given this difficulty, we consider the date of signature of the independent auditor's report. This approach has also been used in other empirical studies in developing economies (Guidara et al., 2014 in South Africa and Owusu-Ansah & Leventis, 2006 in Greece). According to Owusu-Ansah and Leventis (2006) , this date represents a good proxy for the publication date of financial statements, because companies are allowed to publish their annual reports and earnings following the certification of financial statements by an independent auditor.
The Moderating Variables
As shown in H3a, H3b, and H3c, we have three moderating variables dealing respectively with the effects of industry (commercial versus industrial), listing status (listed versus unlisted), and legal and political changes on the association between audit quality, timely disclosure, and the cost of debt.
Control Variables
In our analysis, we include five control variables that have been hypothesized to influence the cost of debt. Large firms generally communicate more information than small ones (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999) . More voluntary disclosure implies less creditors' perceived default risk and thus lower cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998) . In addition, since collateral on debt capital may mitigate agency costs of debt (Karjalainen, 2011) , we control for plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets to proxy for the collateral value of assets (Pittman & Fortin, 2004) . Agency theory predicts the risk shifting and underinvestment between insiders and outside creditors increases with leverage maturity structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Therefore, we control for maturity and we expect that the cost of debt increases with maturity. In addition, high earnings variability implies more risk and less capability to estimate the future earnings of firms (Orens et al., 2010) . Accordingly, it is expected that high earnings variability will increase the cost of debt. Finally, firms reporting negative earnings are characterized by greater uncertainty concerning future profitability (Orens et al., 2010) . Therefore, we expect that a negative earning implies a higher cost of debt.
The Model
To examine the relationship between audit quality, timely disclosure, and the cost of debt, the following model is used: 
where: COD it = Cost of debt is measured using the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for year t and firm i scaled by the short-term and long-term financial debts at the beginning of year t for firm i; Big 4 it = Dummy variable: 1 if an audit report is signed by at least one auditor representing one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 if otherwise;
ERL it = The number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements; Ln(TA) it = The natural logarithm of total assets; MAT it = The ratio of short-term debts to total debts; PPE it = The ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets; LOSS it = A dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the firm reports a negative earning in the fiscal year-end and 0 if otherwise; 
Results
Results in this study are presented as follows. First, we display the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis, and then, we present the results of multivariate analyses.
Descriptive Statistics
Part A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for continuous variables in our study. Cost of debt has a mean of 10.300% and ranges between 4.500% and 17.900%. Earnings reporting lag has a mean of 126 days and ranges between 24 and 283 days. This means that some firms do not respect the maximum period of six months after the fiscal year end required by the Code of Commercial Companies to submit their financial statements to the General Assembly of Shareholders. Maturity has an average of 0.329 and ranges between 0 and 1, while, in average, the ratio of plants and equipments to total assets accounts for 0.316 and ranges from 0.009 to 1.036.
Part B of Table 3 displays the proportion for dummy variables. The percentage of companies audited by Big 4 auditors in our sample accounts for 18.437% and 33.962% of the firms included in the analysis report negative earnings. Finally, 71.875% of firms examined are listed in the Tunisian Stock Exchange, while 56.250% of them belong to industrial sector. 
33.962
List Dummy variable equaling to 1 if the company is listed and 0 if otherwise.
71.875
Ind Dummy variable equaling to 1 if the firm belongs to the industrial sector and 0 if otherwise.
56.250
Notes. COD is measured using the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for firm i and year t divided by the short-term and long-term liabilities at the beginning of year t for firm i; ERL is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements; Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of assets; MAT is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt; PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets; VEAR is the net income for the year N minus the net income for the year N − 1; Big 4 is the size of the firm; LOSS is a dummy variable equaling to 1 if the result of the firm is negative and 0 if otherwise; List is a dichotomous variable equaling to 1 if the company is listed and 0 if otherwise; Ind is a dummy variable equaling to 1 if the firm belongs to the industrial sector and 0 if it belongs to the commercial sector. Table 4 displays the correlation between the cost of debt and continuous independent variables. Results show that earnings reporting lag is positively associated with the cost of debt with a Pearson coefficient accounting for 0.373 (p < 0.01). This result provides a preliminary support for H2 and implies that banks penalise firms communicating their results in a tardy manner with a higher cost of debt. With respect to control variables, maturity seems to have a significant positive effect on the cost of debt, while the presence of a high proportion of plants and equipments to total assets has a negative effect on the same variable. 1.000 Notes. COD is measured using the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for firm i and year t divided by the short-term and long-term liabilities at the beginning of year t for firm i; ERL is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements; Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of assets; MAT is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt; PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets. * , ** , and *** indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Table 5 presents the test of equality of means for the cost of debt and all dichotomous variables (Big 4, LOSS, List, and Ind). With respect to audit quality, the cost of debt is significantly lower for firms audited by Big 4 firms with a mean of 4.900%, while it is about 11.600% for companies audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. The difference of means is about 6.700%, and it is highly significant with the t-statistic of 3.878. Similarly, industrial firms are associated with a higher cost of debt compared to companies operating in commercial industry with two means amounting to 11.700% and 8.600% respectively and the t-statistic of -2.216. By contrast, neither listing status (List) nor LOSS variable has a significant effect on the cost of debt for Tunisian companies. COD is measured using the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for firm i and year t divided by the short-term and long-term liabilities at the beginning of year t for firm i; Big 4 is a dummy variable: 1 if an audit report is signed by at least one auditor representing one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 if otherwise; ERL is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements; Ln ERL is the natural logarithm of ERL; Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of assets; MAT is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt; PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets; LOSS is a dummy variable; VEAR is the variation of the net income; List is a dichotomous variable equaling to 1 if the company is listed and 0 if otherwise; Ind is a dummy variable equaling to 1 if the firm belongs to the industrial sector and 0 if it belongs to the commercial sector. * , ** , and *** indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Univariate Analysis
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The results of multivariate analysis are reported in Table 6 (Model 1). The findings show that audit quality as proxied by Big 4 is negatively and significantly associated with the cost of debt (t = -3.650; p < 0.01). In addition, earnings reporting lag is positively and significantly associated with the cost of debt (t = 6.330; p < 0.01). Therefore, H1 and H2 are supported. The type of auditor reduces the cost of debt in the Tunisian setting and the presence of Big 4 auditor ensures creditors about the credibility of firms' financial statements in a setting characterized by low audit and accounting infrastructure (World Bank, 2006) . In addition, the tardy communication of financial statements reduces the value relevance of information disclosed among debt-holders, implying more uncertainty and a higher cost of debt. With respect to control variables, it seems that earnings variability is positively and significantly associated with the cost of debt in the Tunisian setting (t = 3.320; p < 0.01). Similarly, listed and industrial companies are associated with a higher cost of debt (t = 1.690; p < 0.1 and t = 1.830; p < 0.1) respectively.
As a robustness check for these results, in Model 2, we replace the number of days for earnings reporting lag by the natural logarithm of number of days as suggested by Jaggi and Tsui (1999) and Khlif and Samaha (2014) . The previous results remain stable since the Big 4 variable has a significant negative effect on the cost of debt, while the natural logarithm earnings reporting lag is positively and significantly associated with the same variable.
The Moderating Effects of Industry, Listing Status, and Legal and Political Changes
Industry. H3a tests for the effect of sector type on the association between auditor type, earnings reporting lag, and the cost of debt in the Tunisian setting. As reported in Table 7 , the association remains significant for industrial firms with respect to auditor type (t = -4.020; p < 0.01), while it becomes insignificant for commercial companies. With respect to the association between earnings reporting lag and the cost of debt, the association remains significant for both sectors with a more significant relationship observed for industrial firms (t = 6.280; p < 0.01) compared to commercial ones (t = 3.830; p < 0.01). These findings provide support for the moderating effect of industry on the examined associations and H3a. These results may be explained by the specificity of audit procedures in industrial sector compared to other sectors and the industrial firms' need for external finance from banks in emerging economies where stock exchanges are less developed (Doupnik & Salter, 1995) . Max. VIF 1.990 1.920 Notes. COD is measured using the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for firm i and year t divided by the short-term and long-term liabilities at the beginning of year t for firm i; Big 4 is a dummy variable: 1 if an audit report is signed by at least one auditor representing one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 if otherwise; ERL is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements; Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of assets; MAT is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt; PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets; LOSS is a dummy variable; VEAR is the variation of the net income; List is a dichotomous variable equaling to 1 if the company is listed and 0 if otherwise. Max. VIF 1.910 2.010 Notes. COD is measured using the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for firm i and year t divided by the short-term and long-term liabilities at the beginning of year t for firm i; Big 4 is a dummy variable: 1 if an audit report is signed by at least one auditor representing one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 if otherwise; ERL is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements; Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of assets; MAT is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt; PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets; LOSS is a dummy variable; VEAR is the variation of the net income; Ind is a dummy variable equaling to 1 if the firm belongs to the industrial sector and 0 if it belongs to the commercial sector. * , ** , and *** indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Listing status. H3b tests for the effect of listing status on the association between auditor type, earnings reporting lag, and the cost of debt in the Tunisian setting. As shown in Table 8 above, the relationship remains significant for listed Tunisian firms with respect to auditor type (t = -3.370; p < 0.01), while it is insignificant for unlisted companies. With respect to the association between earnings reporting lag and the cost of debt, the association remains significant for both groups with a more significant relationship observed for listed firms (t = 5.840; p < 0.01) compared to unlisted ones (t = 2.680; p < 0.01). These findings provide support for the moderating effect of listing status on the above relationships and thus H3b is supported. These results may be explained by the additional listing requirements and regulations for listed Tunisian firms (Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007) , implying that banks will require more transparency from listed companies given the stringent listing and legal requirements. COD is measured using the rate of interest paid defined as the interest expense for firm i and year t divided by the short-term and long-term liabilities at the beginning of year t for firm i; Big 4 is a dummy variable: 1 if an audit report is signed by at least one auditor representing one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 if otherwise; ERL is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the publication date of financial statements; Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of assets; MAT is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt; PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets; LOSS is a dummy variable; VEAR is the variation of the net income; List is a dichotomous variable equaling to 1 if the company is listed and 0 if otherwise; Ind is a dummy variable equaling to 1 if the firm belongs to the industrial sector and 0 if it belongs to the commercial sector. * , **
, and *** indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Legal and political changes in Tunisia. H3c tests for the effect of legal and political changes on the association between auditor type, earnings reporting lag, and the cost of debt in the Tunisian setting. As reported in Table 9 (2010) (2011) (2012) ) is characterized by some economic and political troubles which may affect financial institutions' behaviors with respect to cost of debt. With respect to auditor type, the association with the cost of debt remains negative and significant for the three periods considered with a less significant association observed for the period of 2010-2012 (t = -1.820; p < 0.10). This implies that the economic and political troubles have reduced creditors' confidence in audit quality regardless of the auditor type. With respect to earnings reporting lag, the association with the cost of debt is more significant for the period of 2010-2012 (t = 4.530; p < 0.01) than for that of 2006-2009 (t = 2.510; p < 0.05). A plausible explanation for the result is that Tunisian financial institutions become more sensitive to the tardy communication of financial statements following the economic and political troubles in Tunisia.
Overall, it seems that legal and political changes in Tunisia have slightly influenced the associations between auditor type, earnings announcements, and the cost of debt since financial institutions become more sensitive to the tardy communication of information and less concerned with auditor type following some economic and political troubles in Tunisian between 2010 and 2012.
Concluding Remarks
A basic and fundamental question is whether audit quality and the tardy communication of information have an effect on the cost of debt in developing countries where financial institutions play an important role in financing private sector. Given this importance, we examine, in this study, the empirical relationship between these variables in Tunisia for the period spanning from 2003 to 2012.
We find that auditor type is negatively associated with the cost of debt, while earnings reporting lag is positively and significantly associated with the cost of debt. When testing for the moderating effects of industry and listing status, we provide evidence that these associations are more pronounced for industrial companies and listed firms. Furthermore, the legal and institutional changes across the period of investigation slightly moderate the examined associations since financial institutions become more sensitive to the tardy communication of information and less concerned with auditor type following some economic and political troubles in Tunisian between 2010 and 2012.
Our paper contributes to the extant accounting literature dealing with the effect of audit quality and timely disclosure on cost of finance by focusing on the Tunisian setting characterized by low accounting and auditing infrastructure. Our paper highlights how sector characteristics and legal requirements (e.g., listing rules) may affect the relationships between audit quality, timely disclosure, and the cost of debt in an emerging economy. Therefore, managers will have more incentives to increase their commitments towards corporate transparency to increase financial statements' credibility among creditors and reduce accordingly the cost of debt. Finally, our empirical findings highlight the importance of a political and economic environment when one analyses the determinants of the cost of debt.
Given the fact that financial institutions play a crucial role in emerging economies, future research could address the same question in other African markets. In addition, this stream of research should be extended to examine the empirical linkage between audit quality, earnings reporting lag, and the cost of equity capital.
